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President Dodon’s visit to Brussels – 
Contemplating economic suicide 
Michael Emerson and Denis Cenușa 
No 2017-02/3 February 2017 
The newly elected President of Moldova, Igor Dodon, makes his first visit Brussels on February 
7th, following his first visit to Moscow in January, where he announced his wish to repeal his 
country’s Association Agreement with the EU and to join the Eurasian Economic Union instead. 
While this cannot happen until and unless the parliamentary elections in 2018 return a 
parliamentary majority supporting his Socialist party, his statement has already inflicted 
damage by creating strategic uncertainty over Moldova’s European orientation. Dodon’s 
argument seems to ignore the huge restructuring of Moldovan trade towards Europe and away 
from Russia that has taken place over the last decade. To try to set the clock back would be a 
disastrous move – effectively committing economic suicide for Moldova.  
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ext week on February 7th, President Igor Dodon of Moldova is expected to arrive in 
Brussels for his first meeting with the European Union since his election in November 
2016.  
Dodon’s political agenda is overtly ‘pro-Russian’ and is set against the Association Agreement 
with the EU that has been fully in force since July 2016. This agreement contains a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which gives Moldova full access to the EU market for 
virtually all products, while Moldova can take up to ten years to reciprocate by eliminating its 
tariffs on imports from the EU.  
Dodon’s first trip to Moscow 
President Dodon made his first foreign visit to Moscow on January 16-17th, holding talks with 
President Putin and other leading Russian officials. At his press conference with President Putin, 
Dodon said that the Association Agreement “has done Moldova no good” and that he would 
back its repeal and initiate active cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union instead. At 
the press conference following the meeting on January 17th Dodon declared: 
We are pragmatists and we understand that there is an association agreement with 
the European Union. By the way, I have repeatedly come out against signing the agreement. 
I believe that the agreement has done Moldova no good. We have lost the Russian market and, 
strangely enough, our exports to the EU have also fallen. In other words, we have received 
nothing from signing the agreement. And I cannot rule out that after the next parliamentary 
election, this will be the position of the parliamentary majority and I will support that position. 
There is the Socialist Party and I hope they will get a parliamentary majority and the agreement 
will be repealed. 
Regarding cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union, it is very important. Mr Putin has 
spoken about this. In the morning I had a meeting with the leadership of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. Today I put forward an initiative to sign a framework memorandum 
on cooperation with the EAEU. We agreed to begin consultations within the next few weeks 
and sign this memorandum in the next few months. It is not at odds with the agreements that 
Moldova has signed at this point with other partners, but it is the first step toward 
rapprochement. 
I asked Mr Putin to consider the possibility of Moldova getting observer status in the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. I believe this is a good step for us to see what needs to be done and how, 
as well as to gather information from both sides.1 
For the time being, however, Dodon does not have the power to follow through with this 
ambitious agenda, since his constitutional competences as president are weak, and the 
parliamentary majority and government are dominated by parties with a pro-European agenda 
that do not agree with him. However, new parliamentary elections will be held no later than 
                                                          
1 See http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744 
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2018, when Dodon eyes winning a parliamentary majority, and thereby acquiring the necessary 
support to pursue his objectives. 
Moldova’s trade structures have changed radically towards Europe 
For his visit to Brussels it is first of all pertinent to get the facts straight. Over the last decade 
Moldova’s trade structure has massively changed in the direction of the EU and away from 
Russia. The primary facts are as follows (see also Figure 1): 
o Moldovan exports to the EU rose from $444 million in 2005 to $1,218 in 2015, thus an 
increase of 274%. 
o Over the same period its exports to Russia declined from $347 million to $241 million, 
thus a decrease of 30%.  
Also in the shorter-run alongside the negotiation, signing and entry into force of the Association 
Agreement with the EU, the story is the same: 
o Moldovan exports to the EU rose from $1,103 million in 2012 to $1,218 million in 2015, 
an increase of 11%, while exports to Russia declined. 
Even if Russia ended its sanctions against Moldovan exports, and these returned from $241 in 
2015 to their 2010 level of $404 million, they still would not amount to more than one-third of 
the Moldova’s current level of exports to the EU (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Moldova's exports, 2005 to 2015 ($ millions) 
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A similar and indeed spectacular picture emerges for the Transnistrian region, which has also 
increased the share of its exports going to the EU from 20% in 2005 to around 66% in 2015-16, 
while exports to Russia fell drastically from 40% in 2005 to 8% in 2014. This shows that even 
the Russian-controlled breakaway region has had to move radically towards the EU market, 
which President Dodon fully ignored during his visit to Moscow. 
The reasons for this are clear. The EU has been liberalising imports from Moldova already for 
some years since 2006 (with the General System of Preferences - GSP, GSP+), and more actively 
after 2008 (Autonomous Trade Preferences), before signing the Association Agreement.  
Russia’s punitive sanctions against Moldova 
Meanwhile Russia chose to do the opposite and to sanction imports from Moldova with 
politically manipulated technical standards, especially health standards for agricultural 
products (of both vegetable and animal origin).  
Moscow’s political choice was that Moldova should be severely punished because it was 
cooperating more closely with the EU. In particular, in September 2013, Russia banned the 
import of Moldovan wines; in July 2014 it banned the import of fresh fruit and vegetables; and 
in August 2014, it introduced import duties on 19 categories of products (contrary to the 
obligations under the CIS free trade agreement, which both countries ratified).2  
It is absolutely contrary to WTO rules to manipulate scientifically objective technical standards 
for political purposes, but Russia does not take WTO rules seriously when they run counter to 
its geo-political wish to bully and punish small neighbours for insubordinate (i.e. independent) 
behaviour. Russia has applied the same methods, in parallel, to Ukraine and Georgia. 
Since 2015 Moscow has begun to reopen its market partially for some specific Moldovan goods 
(vegetables and fruits, wines, etc.) but to a limited number of companies, the majority of them 
originating from the pro-Russian Autonomous region of Gagauzia and Transnistrian separatist 
region. Russia has thus been using its ‘carrot and stick’ approach to heighten tensions and 
divisions between pro-European central authorities of Moldova and the Gaugazian autonomy. 
Moldova’s new economic inter-dependence with the European market and the decline of 
Russia are of huge proportions. Moldova is now five times more dependent on the EU market 
than that of Russia, with the following shares (see also Figure 2).   
o Exports to Russia       12% 
o Exports to the EU       62% 
o Exports to the ‘wider European market’    72% 
 
                                                          
2 CIS FT Agreement (http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/printPreview/text?id=3183). 
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Figure 2. Moldova's exports by region as % of worldwide total, 2015 
 
 
The wider European market 
Moldova is currently extending its network of free trade agreements with countries of the 
‘wider European market’, consisting of all the EU’s close neighbours that have free trade 
agreements with it. This includes, beyond the EU itself the member states of EFTA (Norway and 
others), CEFTA (the non-EU Balkan states), the EU customs union (Turkey), the EU’s south 
Mediterranean partners, and Moldova’s other DCFTA partners (Ukraine, Georgia). Moldova is 
both free and encouraged to build up this network of free trade areas. In total this wider 
European market accounts for 72% of Moldova’s total exports. However this would be excluded 
by acceding to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which President Dodon proposes.  
The EU has been supplying substantial macroeconomic loan assistance to Moldova alongside 
the IMF’s substantial grant assistance, while the European Investment Bank and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development have become the biggest source of foreign investment.  
Armenia’s depressing experience in the Eurasian Economic Union 
When considering getting closer to or even into the Eurasian Economic Union, President Dodon 
should further reflect on the experience of Armenia, since he is in effect putting in motion a 
delayed replay of the Armenian scenario of 2013. Armenia, like Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, 
had negotiated an Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU, which was due to be signed 
in November 2013 at an EU summit in Vilnius. Russia was opposed to these pacts and 
summoned the Armenian President to Moscow two months earlier in September for a totally 
non-transparent meeting, except that Armenia accepted Russia’s pressure to renege on signing 
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with the EU and to join the Eurasian Economic Union. The quid pro quo of this volte face has 
never been revealed, but it is widely supposed to have been based on blackmail, with threats 
from Russia to weaken its guarantee of security for Armenia against Azerbaijan and to make 
life difficult for the Armenian diaspora in Russia.  
As a result of joining the Eurasian Economic Union, Armenia has been obliged to raise its import 
tariffs at the WTO, i.e. cutting itself out of European and world markets. Armenia was so 
unhappy about this that it requested exemptions from the common external tariff of the 
Eurasian Economic Union for as many as 800 tariff lines, and had to spend its first year in the 
Union trying to negotiate at least transitional arrangements to slow if not to stop these 
protectionist steps. On top of that, the Russian economy went into recession and pulled the 
rest of the Eurasian Economic Union down with it. Figures show a drop of exports from Armenia 
to Russia from €352 million in 2013 to €176 million in 2015. In brief, if President Dodon were 
to look at Armenia’s experience in the Eurasian Economic Union, he will not see a pretty sight.   
Committing economic policy suicide 
All of this means, in a nutshell, that President Dodon is already damaging the Moldovan 
economy by creating strategic uncertainty over its future for foreign investors. The idea of 
Moldova repealing the Association Agreement with the EU in order to join the Eurasian 
Economic Union is entirely feasible technically, and an open option politically as of today (with 
40-50% support according to recent polls). However, such action would be committing as close 
to economic suicide as Moldova could possibly imagine.  
